A common yardstick against which to judge spending on health and safety across all sectors of the economy is needed if resources are not to be diverted away from areas of greater need. It is argued that the J-value is an objective, absolute and universal scale that fulfils that need. Previous judgments on the value for human life are reproduced, but the J-value demonstrates that significant differences exist currently in the regulatory standards for different industries. Case studies show that very different levels of health and safety spend have been demanded in practice in those industries.
Recent risk stories such as conkers being banned from school 1,2 and horse-chestnut trees being felled 3 suggest that responses to risks to health and safety may be arbitrary and often disproportionate. But such managerial reactions are not confined to the school-yard. In the absence of generally accepted figures relating tolerable risk to the cost of abatement, common across all industries, there is a good chance that higher-than-warranted safety expenditure will be embarked upon in certain industries perceived to be "high-risk". This may be either as a result of one-off Government action or else through unilateral action on the part of the company concerned, perhaps because of perceived public pressure. Meanwhile those industries seen as "low-risk" may underspend significantly, so that markedly different costs and standards of safety may pertain in different industrial plants and economic sectors. While some variation has to be expected, especially given the uncertainties involved in quantifying risk, too great a variation would suggest that the country as a whole was diverting resources away from areas of greater need, as Government has recognised 4 .
There have been some glaring examples of the use of very large resources to reduce risks that were already small. For example, the speed restrictions imposed on the whole of the UK's railway system following the Hatfield train crash cost the rail companies hundreds of millions of pounds and may well have increased the risks to the travelling public 5 . Then the spending of billions of pounds on BSE countermeasures after 1996 when the threat was all but over has been calculated to have saved around 10 lives at most 6 . In the nuclear industry, BNFL's Enhanced Actinide Removal and Site Ion-Exchange Encapsulation plants cost together 7 about £800M and may save one or two lives over their lifetimes. In November 2003, the police closed Tower Bridge for several days after a fathers' rights protester ("Spiderman") climbed a nearby crane and refused to come down. The police were worried that he might fall and be blown onto the bridge, but the cost of the resultant traffic disruption was estimated at £5M per day 7 .
But while we may feel that the expenditures mentioned above were out of proportion, the task of achieving a consistent and proportionate response to any given risk has been hampered by the lack of a universal scale against which such a response could be measured. Previous attempts were either industry-specific, such as the IAEA's International Nuclear Event Scale, or were purely economic, based on a market analysis which might value some people's lives more than others', or else were founded on opinion, opening them up to the charge of subjectivity, even if a large number of people had been polled. This article discusses the new Judgment-or J-value technique, which provides an objective, absolute and universal scale against which health-and-safety spend in any sector may be measured, providing an explicit judgment on whether the plan or scheme under consideration is reasonable.
The life-quality index
The first step to deriving the J-value is to find a suitable measure for the quality of life. It may be postulated that the fundamental factors influencing the quality of life for any given individual are first how long he can expect to live from now on and secondly how much he will have available to spend, both on life's necessities and on its luxuries. Given these two postulates, it may be shown 9,10 that an appropriate measure is given by the index, Q 0 , where: (1) in which X is the life expectancy of the average individual in years, G (£/y) is the average annual earnings (which may be taken as the GDP per person), while the exponent, q, is the work-life balance, viz. the ratio of the time spent working, w, to the time remaining, 1-w. Each of G, q and X, is an objective variable; a reasonable value for q has been deduced to be about 1/7, while G and X are available from national statistics and actuarial tables respectively. Furthermore the term, G q , for the inevitably low, fractional values of work-life balance, q, that will occur, has the form of a utility function, where initial earnings, essential for food and clothing, are valued more highly than later increments of earnings, which are used to pay for luxuries. Figure 1 gives an illustrative example of such a utility function, with q = 0.35. Thus it may be seen that the term, G q , emerges as the utility of personal earnings per year, as judged by the average individual in the nation. This allows the intuitively attractive interpretation that the life-quality index is simply the sum of all the annual utilities for the years remaining to the average individual. The last stage comes from noting that goods and services that an individual can use today are more valuable than goods for which he must wait before enjoying, and this can be allowed for by replacing the life expectancy, X, by a discounted life expectancy, X d , where, of course, as the discount rate tends to zero. Thus the final version of the life-quality index is:
The rate of time preference should be appropriate to the long periods over which health and safety effects are likely to be seen, as a result of both the long operational life of safety equipment and the long period over which health effects can show up. Low discount rates are standard in such cases, in the range 1-4 % 5 . This range covers, for instance, the discount factors used by BNFL (2.5% pa) and British Energy (3% pa) in assessing their nuclear decommissioning liabilities.
As an aside, it may be noted that the discounting life expectancy has the interesting effect of reducing the lowering of life expectancy with age. Thus whereas an infant has a life expectancy of nearly 80 years, his 4%-discounted life expectancy will be only ~24 years; the corresponding figures for a 40-year-old are ~40 years and ~20 years. Thus it may be seen that under a 4% discount rate, the time horizon by which an individual may judge the benefits or costs of his actions changes little in the first 40 years of life. This may provide a good model of and rationale for human decision-making at different ages: for example, young people tend not to plan long into the future, certainly not twice as far as a forty-year old, which consideration of their undiscounted life expectancy would prompt them to do.
The J-value
Suppose the average person in a group of people is considering spending money on a scheme that will enhance the safety of group members. The discounted life expectancy will increase, but the yearly income available to the average person will decrease. The changes in these two factors will alter the life-quality index, one in the upward and the other in the downward direction. Clearly the average person's interests will be served only if the new life-quality index is higher than it was originally.
We may carry out a small-signal analysis to relate the change in life expectancy to the changes in available income and life expectancy, and by imposing the limiting condition of no change in life quality, deduce the maximum annual income that the average person should be prepared to spend on the safety scheme in question. We may extend this figure to the group simply by multiplying by the number of people in the group, so as to achieve the maximum annual expenditure, a pop (£/y), that the group as a whole should be prepared to countenance. Large groups, such as the people living near a particular industrial plant, may normally be assumed to have the same age distribution as the national population. There will be occasions, however, when information on the age and life expectancy specific to the group needs to be used, as, for example, in considering the desirability of otherwise of treatments for women with breast cancer. The work-life balance, q, is normally kept at the nationally estimated figure, and, as a matter of moral principle, it is considered that the figure for average income, G, should be kept the same for all groups within the nation.
The Judgment-or J-value is found by dividing the actual annual expenditure being considered, â pop (£/y), by the maximum that the group should be prepared to spend, a pop :
which should be less than or equal to unity for an acceptable safety scheme. When, as is often the case, a single, initial spend, Â pop (£), is dominant, then we may write conservatively 10 that: (4) where ∆X d is the change in life expectancy averaged over the group brought about by the safety scheme in question. The change in life expectancy may be found from physicians estimates or from detailed calculations using actuarial tables. Actuarial calculations for the nuclear industry are complex because the effects of radiation do not appear until after a long delay, typically 10 years, and are then stochastic over a period of about 30 years 11, 12 .
While the safety expenditure will often be met by the state (e.g. the NHS) or an industrial company, it is argued that the benefits should still be based on the willingness to pay of the benefiting group. This is fully consistent with the general principle of welfare economics that the benefits of a public programme are measured most appropriately by the aggregate willingness to pay on the part of those benefiting from the programme. 7
Interpretation of the J-value scale
Since the J-value is the ratio of the actual spend to the maximum reasonable spend, it follows that a safety scheme with a J-value greater than unity will cause a net disbenefit. Thus if a scheme is calculated to have a J-value of 3.0, then it is costing three times what it should, and effort should be spent in finding another way of producing similar safety benefits much more cheaply.
Meanwhile, a safety scheme with a fractional J-value is acceptable. For example, a J-value of 0.2 indicates that the scheme will provide a safety benefit without using up too much resource. In fact, the scheme could be augmented and made up to five times as expensive without creating a 
net disbenefit (although the low J-value should not be taken to imply that spending more money is essential).
Using J-values to evaluate regulators' recommendations
A recent study 10 considered the recommendations of regulatory or quasi-regulatory bodies for road, rail, the health industry, the nuclear industry and offshore oil and gas, with corresponding regulators: the Department for Transport, the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE), the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) and the Health and Safety Executive. The results are shown in Figure 2 .
The values are generally of the same order, and clustered above and below the maximally risk-averse, reasonable position of J = 1.0. But NICE's general recommendations and those for road safety are well below the J = 1 line, while the Jvalues for offshore oil and gas stand out as high, as does the Jvalue for radiation workers when the rate of time preference and the loan interest rate are set at 2.5%. The large difference between the lower and upper J-values for radiation-dose safety measures reflects the long delays before health effects may be seen.
One reasonable way of bringing the regulators' recommendations into harmony would be to ensure equality of J-values at a discount rate of 2.5% pa. This would have the effect of reducing the required safety spend against multiple fatalities in the rail industry by about 25% but doubling the prescribed safety expenditure for road and against single deaths on the railways. At the same time, the required safety spend in the offshore industry would be more than halved. The common value of a human life would then be about £2.5M, which is very much in line with previous estimates of £2.1M 14 and £2.6 -£3.9M 15 (all 2003 £'s).
Meanwhile, the NRPB advisory figure to avert a man-Sievert for radiation workers would be reduced from £50,000 to £28,000, while the corresponding figure for the general public would rise from £20,000 to £35,000. NICE's criteria for economic acceptance of a new drug treatment would then need to be revised upwards by a factor of about 4 in order to come into line.
Case studies across industrial sectors
The study referred to above also considered actual cases 13 in a number of sectors where expenditure on safety was under consideration or was made. The results are shown in Table  1 . It is clear from the very large spread of J-value that the measure of consensus apparent in the J-values for the regula- tors' recommendations is not mirrored in these cases.
Considering train protection systems, while the extremely expensive ERTMS has so far been rejected, TPWS has been installed, despite having a J-value that is significantly higher than unity, indicating poor value for money. Moving on to health, the case of Imatinib demonstrates NICE's tendency to limit treatments even when the J-value is less than unity. Moreover, while NICE has recommended Vinorelbine, Paclitaxel, Docetaxol and Zanamivir, their very low J-values raise the question as to why NICE had to be consulted in the first place.
The early BSE/vCJD countermeasures 16 , which had a Jvalue well below unity, were implemented, but so were the post-1996 countermeasures, which had an extremely high J-value. This high J-value indicates very poor cost-effectiveness, and implies that the £7 bn estimated to have been involved could have been spent much better elsewhere.
Both the BNFL clean-up plants considered have extremely high J-values, whether one considers the protection of a critical group or the protection of the UK population as a whole. One of these has been implemented by BNFL with the approval of the Environment Agency, while the other has not. The very high J-value of the installed Technetium-99 Removal Plant implies that a very large sum of money has been sanctioned to reduce an already small risk of one cancer being contracted. On the other hand, the below-unity J-value associated with the unsanctioned drug Imatinib, as well as the very low J-values associated with Vinorelbine, Paclitaxel and Docetaxol, make it clear that once a person is actually suffering from the disease, the funds available to ameliorate the illness and extend life are subject to much tighter constraints. It is difficult to understand the logic of such disparities.
The case for the installation of VOCs control measures on small petrol stations looks marginal at best, based on the J-values produced and the large uncertainties on the harm caused. This supports Government's proposal to derogate existing small petrol stations.
Conclusions
The J-value has been developed as a universal scale against which to measure and assess health and safety expenditure in all sectors of the economy. Its use in a number of diverse sectors has been demonstrated, as has its ability to produce figures for the value of a human life that coincide approximately with previous estimates based on different approaches.
Given its capability to translate a variety of cost-benefit formats onto a common, objective yardstick and its easy interpretation in terms of how much more or less than the reasonable maximum spend is being considered, the Jvalue is proposed for use by decision makers on health and safety in all sectors. It is suggested that its adoption could lead to more consistent and hence better targeting of health and safety expenditure in all areas of the economy.
